◆ SpookStack

3. (Continued) Nein ar Prk" Fiabe tata flee AP oy Pern 6 On CN RRR LAI ML oi Me SE mt INI 1 oe eae taken aD Be ee eet tr ge Ane mer pep candy RS Pg peel ten eer pel fa nett sie me bite « SECRET” overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will sta- tion in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-29) D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insur- rection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. (Paras. 22-23) E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and indus- trial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is un- likely that agricultural and industrial production can be sig- nificantly increased within the next year or so. The ex- pected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963. (Paras. 30-35) F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing. This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, how- ever, Gare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances, for fear of the regime’s massive apparatus for surveillance and repression. (Paras. 36-41) G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would in- crease. Even soit is unlikely that the regime could be over- thrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless sub- stantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming. (Paras. 42-51) H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the “inevitable” revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this 2 SECRET, lt