ADocumentaryHistoryOfTheCubanMissileCrisis1962

354 pages · May 08, 2026 · Document date: Sep 16, 1992 · Broad topic: General · Topic: Adocumentaryhistoryofthecubanmissilecrisis1962 · 354 pages OCR'd

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84. McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Meetings with Senaior Russell, Senator Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson,” 23 Detober 1962 AipR MEMORANDUM FOR THE FiLe SUBJECT: Meetings with Senator Russell, Senator Hickenisczer, and Chairman Vinson 1. <Atthe President's request i contacted several members of the leadership of the Congress with the following results. Ina . Tobe & : 14 = oe > =e: meeting on rineest 23rcé, Senator Russell indicated 4 ‘ess critical attitude toward Administration policy than was evident at the leadership meeting the night before. He in generat approvec the effectiveness and the utility of the blockade, expressed serious { concern over the Soviet/U.S. confrontation which would result | from the blockade, and accepted the course of action only because it would lead to the next phase which would be that of ' taking the missiles and offensive weapons out of Cuba at a time { and by means of our own determination. Russell favored more : positive action against Cuba which would involve not only air strike but invasion. In the initial part of the discussion he felt i the President's speech had not established a clear-cut right for | military action; however, by careful reference to the speech (a copy of which I had with me) he agreed that the wording did give i the President right of action without further notification. In H general, Russell's attitude was considerably different than the | leadership meeting and might be summed up as reserved approval. | ‘ | { During the conversation, I outlined my “eelings that our purposes must be to remove the missiles and also to remove Castro as is outlined in a separate memorandum, 2. Senator Hickenlooper approved the speech, the action, and the anticipated further action without reservation. He expressed confidence in the Presi€ent as cic Senator Ressell but te Fresident's advisors rt serious reservations concerning some of who he felt would influence the President to follow a very weax anc compromising line. However, it appeared to me tha was greatly relieved by the speech anc more satistiec with o Cuban colicy than was evident at the leacezship meeting.

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84. McCone, Memorandum for the File, “Meetings with Senaior
Russell, Senator Hickenlooper, and Chairman Vinson,”
23 Detober 1962

AipR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FiLe
SUBJECT: Meetings with Senator Russell, Senator Hickenisczer,
and Chairman Vinson

1. <Atthe President's request i contacted several members
of the leadership of the Congress with the following results. Ina
. Tobe & : 14 = oe > =e:

meeting on rineest 23rcé, Senator Russell indicated 4 ‘ess critical
attitude toward Administration policy than was evident at the
leadership meeting the night before. He in generat approvec the
effectiveness and the utility of the blockade, expressed serious

{ concern over the Soviet/U.S. confrontation which would result

| from the blockade, and accepted the course of action only

because it would lead to the next phase which would be that of

' taking the missiles and offensive weapons out of Cuba at a time

{ and by means of our own determination. Russell favored more

: positive action against Cuba which would involve not only air

strike but invasion. In the initial part of the discussion he felt

i the President's speech had not established a clear-cut right for

| military action; however, by careful reference to the speech (a

copy of which I had with me) he agreed that the wording did give

i the President right of action without further notification. In

H general, Russell's attitude was considerably different than the

| leadership meeting and might be summed up as reserved approval. |

‘

{

During the conversation, I outlined my “eelings that our
purposes must be to remove the missiles and also to remove
Castro as is outlined in a separate memorandum,

2. Senator Hickenlooper approved the speech, the action,
and the anticipated further action without reservation. He
expressed confidence in the Presi€ent as cic Senator Ressell but
te Fresident's advisors

serious reservations concerning some of

who he felt would influence the President to follow a very weax anc
compromising line. However, it appeared to me tha
was greatly relieved by the speech anc more satistiec with o

Cuban colicy than was evident at the leacezship meeting.